Thursday, February 26, 2009
Ikram Sehgal
Months of intense pressure by the Pakistan Army on Maulana Fazlullah resulted in considerable collateral damage to his organization but also dislocation of thousands of local population and loss of precious lives of both civilians and Pakistani soldiers. A peace agreement devised by Sufi Mohammad, leader of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM), has the backing of the NWFP government as well as tacit sanction of the federal government.
There is bound to be mixed opinion about any agreement with terrorists of the Fazlullah-kind, the misperceptions force-multiplied by the confusion prevailing. The government did a terrible job of preparing the people of Pakistan for the proposed deal, more importantly the world was left mostly aghast. With the PPP trying to project a secular image in the world, the Presidency has been sensitive to growing western criticism by talking about the implementing of the Sharia at some future point "when complete peace has been restored in Swat". NATO expressed its reservations and after some hesitation (and in line with US Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke) US Defence Secretary Robert Gates joined the chorus of critical voices. Unsurprisingly India, in firm self-denial about the roots and causes of terrorism of the non-Muslim kind within its own territory, is predicting dire consequences for the world. Engaged heavily in stoking the Swat cauldron, one can understand their motivated interest in protecting their "investment" in Fazlullah.
Hit hardest by the ongoing fighting, the people of Swat have welcomed the ceasefire. Observers and analysts who know the area, its history and its people closely have also welcomed the prospects of lasting peace. Experience of the ongoing "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan and in FATA should have brought home the truth that though their motivation may look alike from the distance and even though the ideology they profess may have common features and certainly linkages operationally, Al Qaeda and Taliban are quite different as organizations. Al Qaeda may be destroyed and defeated militarily but the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily or eliminated physically because it has become a mindset, an ideology prevalent in large parts of the tribal population of Pakistan. Many complex reasons prevent this situation being eliminated in a short time. Moreover Fazlullah needed to be isolated from the mainstream, Maulana Sufi Mohammad does that effectively.
Fazlullah has instructed his following not to display arms in public, it would have reinforced his rhetoric about being "the victor". This public perception is contrary to facts; the Pakistan Army has understandable reservations because ceasefires in the past have been used to regroup and re-fit. Previous peace agreements also collapsed because viz (1) the government backed out from some of its commitments and (2) far from having a unified command separate entities among the Taliban have been acting independently against any peace arrangement. Trust, which is a precondition for smooth working, is badly lacking. There is apprehension that implementation of the Sharia would undermine the judicial system of Pakistan; that is not true. Provisions in our Constitution include the 'Objectives Resolution' providing for the implementation of Islamic laws in this country. The far bigger problem is to define what exactly is the Sharia; determining that will be a complex task for the Qazis and their courts.
The demand for implementation of the Sharia in Swat is nothing new; this longstanding demand has some justification. Swat is a former so-called 'Princely State', a territory being ruled indirectly in British times through a local ruler, the Wali of Swat on behalf of the British, but under indigenous laws. The status of Swat was kept intact at the time of independence, never being formally incorporated into Pakistan administratively, politically or legally. Formal merger with Pakistan took place as late as 1969. The legal system under which the Wali was providing justice was a combination of Islamic injunctions and tribal customs or interpretations of those injunctions. Qazi courts provided quick and cheap justice with the Wali himself being the final legal authority.
This legal system was maintained during the initial years after the merger till the 1973 Constitution made Swat a part of the Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA) directly under the control of the President of Pakistan as represented by the Governor of NWFP. The traditional legal set-up was still not touched. Things became difficult only after 1975 when the Governor introduced a regulation giving legal powers to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Swat District. The two parallel legal systems created procedural confusion and delays in the dispensation of justice. As rightly stated by Amber Darr in his article, giving the DC legal powers in addition to his executive functions was a violation of the principle of separation between executive and judiciary. This situation created inconvenience and frustration, and led to dissatisfaction among the people in Swat. A legal judgment by the Superior Courts against this unsatisfactory situation in PATA came too late.
In 1994 the TSNM under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad succeeded in their fight for the implementation of the Sharia or – as we have seen- for the return to the status quo of 1969, the Nizam-e-Adl was proclaimed. The demand had been granted by the PPP-government in 1994 after fruitless efforts for nearly 25 years to suppress the movement. Though successive governments tried to implement the agreement of 1994 the situation was less than satisfactory. The events of 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the US in November 2001 created a wave of anger among the Pakistani Pashtuns. Sufi Mohammad, whose movement till then had not been militant, led a group of several thousand followers to Afghanistan to join the fight in support of his fellow Pashtuns. The campaign ended in a disaster with most of the Swatis killed or captured. Rashid Dostum buried many of them alive in Shebergan after the Pakistanis were handed over by Maulana Dadullah to Dostum in exchange for allowing the Afghan elements in his Taliban force surrounded in Konduz to go free. On his return Sufi Mohammad was tried and put into jail. Fearful of the parents of the youth lost in Afghanistan, he elected to remain in jail for his own safety. Militancy then surfaced next in Swat under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law Fazlullah or 'Maulana Radio'; by 2006 or early 2007 it had become quite virulent. The war in Afghanistan led towards a radicalization of the Sufi's movement and Fazlullah capitalized on Sufi Mohammad's absence.
Those who talk about the "barbarians being 100 miles from the gates of Islamabad" must understand that the peace deal towards the implementation of the Sharia is simply the concession of a demand already conceded earlier. The local Swati population, mostly Yusufzai Pashtuns, need peace and harmony in their lives. We must give the Sufi Mohammad initiative a good try, keeping the military option always open and not letting Fazlullah call the shots. While many hurdles remain, that the people of Swat want to give the deal a chance should be enough reason to go for it.
P.S: I acknowledge, with gratitude, the research and analysis thereof of Dr Bettina Robotka of the Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi.
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Source:http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=164578
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