Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Nasim Zehra
Multiple outcome of the implementation of the Malakand Peace Agreement between Sufi Muhammad and the government is unfolding before us. It ranges from beginnings of peace in violence-wrecked Swat to ongoing negotiations between the principle interlocutors, the ANP government, the army and the TNSM Chief Sufi Muhammad; from the emergence of common position between the government's principal interlocutor Sufi Muhammad and the government's principle antagonist Maulvi Fazlullah of Swat Tehreek-i-Talibaan Pakistan (TTP) to points of debate or even disagreements between them. The immediate gains and the immediate problems that are obvious at this early stage of the Malakand peace accord are indeed indicative of the opportunities and the many risks this accord presents.
Reported kidnappings in the post-accord period have included the newly-posted District Coordination Officer (DCO), Khushhal Khan, his six guards and three National Bank of Pakistan employees including a cashier. The DCO was released after six hours. A TTP Swat spokesman had reportedly told Reuters: 'He is our guest. We have to discuss some issues with him. We will serve him with tea and then free him." The National Bank employees, who were kidnapped from Odigram area near Mingora, have not yet been released.
The list of initial 'positives' visible in Swat is also undeniable. Return of the Internally Displaced People(IDPs) from the Swat region has begun; all boys schools have opened while girls schools till only grade 4 have opened; instead of armed militias ordinary people roam the public spaces in Mingora and its immediate vicinity. Life is though only limping back to some normalcy. Mingora and its neighbouring areas present a contrast to even a fortnight back. Then people lived under virtual terror and state institutions, law–enforcement agencies and the army were virtually non-existent if not paralyzed.
The government's plan, worked out jointly by the army and the ANP is an attempt to initiate a process whereby the public space ceded to the TTP-Swat and other militant and criminal groups is retrieved by the government. This would involve removing the TTP's check-posts, ensuring that the law-enforcement agencies become functional, putting an end to kidnappings and killings of local citizens, enabling the men and women of Swat to lead a normal life and ending the militants' control of public spaces. Given the extent to which the government and the state lost control of Swat and conversely the extent to which TTP acquired control of Swat , the task of retrieving control will be a complex one.
Clearly the elements in the government-army strategy to reassert government's writ include dialogue backed by incentives, quick dispensation of compensation, show of force and development. Within the immediate context dialogue, quick compensation and show of force are being used. Development initiatives, including reconstruction of schools, hospitals, police stations, peoples' homes etc are being planned for implementation as soon as the security situation improves.
The two-step dialogue includes dialogue with the direct interlocutor and indirect dialogue with Maulvi Fazllulah of TTP-Swat. The beginnings of partial peace in Swat signal the early success of the dialogue approach. The ceasefire announcements by TTP-Swat, its decisions to remove TTP check posts, its decision to not hinder movement of army personnel and other government officials are also a positive yield of the direct and indirect dialogue approach. However conversely indirect dialogue is also surfacing the expected: TTP- Swat is putting forward their demands which also violate the Constitution and the law of Pakistan. They have declared girls only up to grade four can attend schools. Release of TTP-Swat members in government custody is also being demanded. Question of the army's future presence in Swat is also being discussed. These issues notwithstanding, there is continuing dialogue and not a deadlock.
Then there is the Adl regulation, 2009. It is a vehicle through which the NWFP government-army believes that their principle antagonists the TTP-Swat can be delegitimized in the eyes of the public. If their stated cause is bringing justice to the people then the proposed Adl regulation, 2009 is intended to assure and then demonstrate to the people of Malakand that by bringing the appeal process to the Malakand Division, the people of Malakand will get justice without travelling to Peshawar and to Islamabad. Additionally by inducting additional judges and court officers for the existing Shariah courts in Malakand, the government will also ensure 'speedy and accessible justice.' These appointments will go through the usual judiciary route. The revival of the District Magistracy system to expedite the legal process is also being contemplated. This is then the crux of what the government has agreed to in the Adl regulation. There are no new laws that, at this stage are being proposed. TNSM's representative in the February 15 jirga meeting in Peshawar assured the government that of the six responsibilities of the government, which include culture, education, finance, foreign policy, security and law, TNSM's agenda was only focused on law. "They are also only focused on Malakand, not the rest of the country" was the refrain of an ANP negotiator.
The centre-piece of this strategy to retrieve control of Swat is the TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad. The initial impact of this centre-piece is repeatedly broadcast through all television channels. The image is of Sufi Mohammad being followed by hundreds of people conveys that he commands respect amongst the people of Swat. His decision to camp in Swat till peace returns has won him the status of a saviour. Within a context in which the people of Swat have experienced being virtually abandoned by those who were to safeguard them and Swat's public spaces, such a reaction towards Sufi Mohammad is not surprising.
The strategy is largely on track. It is being followed according to the script on which the army and ANP had been working, for at least five months. In the comings days barring the disruption of the peace effort by a third party, peace efforts will probably proceed smoothly. There will be a greater presence of the provincial cabinet members including the Chief Minister in Swat, the compensation package to the Swat inhabitants who suffered during the militant-army operations will be distributed and there will be some movement on the release of TTP prisoners.
These gains notwithstanding especially against the backdrop of an earlier dreadful Swat situation, there are three objectives the government will seek to achieve to actually demonstrate that the Malakand peace agreement has actually 'delivered.' One to not allow the TTP-Swat to implement its own interpretation of Shariah, within and beyond the public space in Swat. Two, the government should debilitate organizationally and resource-wise, through establishment of check-posts, terror and public trials etc of organized and armed militias in Swat and beyond. Three, to prevent the TTP from functioning as a deadly and armed militia which pursues the objective of forcing its own version of Shariah through terror.
The only viable effort to re-establish the writ of the state requires that the government does not compromise on these three objectives. The Malakand agreement is proving to be a first positive step, but clearly an insufficient one.
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst. Email: nasimzehra@ hotmail.com
Source: http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=164402
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