Monday, May 4, 2009

Consequences of Talibanisation

Monday, May 04, 2009
Talat Masood


The army’s operation against the Taliban in Buner and Dir in close coordination with the police and the Frontier Corp was absolutely essential. It has come albeit late when it seemed as though the state had abdicated its responsibility and the military was shy of engaging in counterinsurgency operations. Nonetheless, it is a good beginning that needs to be pursued to its logical end.
Losing to the Taliban is an untenable proposition if Pakistan has to retain its identity as a nation. It would not only mean surrendering territory to a militant group but also losing an ideological battle. The prospect of a Taliban takeover means the collapse of the state. No wonder it raised alarm bells all around the world when the TSNM took over Swat and pushed into Buner.
A worse case scenario of a Taliban takeover would mean the end of all institutions of the state. The army would be replaced by the Taliban militia, civil administration would be taken over by the mullahs, politics would be banned and democracy would be substituted by a fascist, obscurantist ideology. It would be equally devastating for the economy and the country would slide into bankruptcy. Our relations with every country in the world, including our best friends — China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — would be adversely affected and Pakistan would be politically isolated and economically de-linked from the international economy.
The prospects of the Taliban gaining control over conventional and nuclear arms would be totally unacceptable to the international community and will invite a strong response. With a deeply antagonistic attitude of the Taliban towards education, especially girls’ education, the country will plunge into darkness. All benefits of globalisation will disappear and it would be very difficult to relate to the world. Participation in a globalised economy demands a state to conduct its affairs on the basis of universal principles and recognised norms of behaviour.
Clearly, if the fight against the Taliban is perceived by our people as an extension of our support for the Americans as some of our vernacular press, politicians and commentators would like us to believe, then there is no way that the military will be able to defeat them. Talibanisation is the anti-thesis of Quaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan. If any one is under the impression that the Taliban will bring in good governance, security and justice to the areas that they control he must be living in a world of fantasy. The expeditious passing of the resolution by the National Assembly supporting the Nizam-e-Adl regulation is a clear manifestation of how superficially we are treating issues that are of vital national interest.
Despite the obvious dangers inherent in the expanding influence of the Taliban no one speaks out against, or stands up to, them with the exception of few. The politico-religious parties and religious scholars do not speak out because they do not want to lose the support of radical groups. Also their hatred of the Americans and Indians blinds them from seeing the dangers inherent in this approach. Paradoxically, these elements will be equally marginalised if the Taliban were to continue expanding. The JUI-F has apparently lost ground to the militants and its power base is shrinking.
Politicians from the ANP and the PPP are scared to take a position against the Taliban in public as their lives are threatened and the state cannot protect them, although they are in power. President Zardari appears too preoccupied in consolidating his political position despite the fact that he got elected with a comfortable majority. He has bunkered himself and is over concerned about his personal safety and unable to provide leadership in combating insurgencies and fighting radicalism. Prime Minister Gilani is showing resolve but the rest of the top leadership is weak and lacks ideological and intellectual clarity and this is reflected in the formulation of national policies.
Mr Holbrooke in his recent interview with the New York Times remarked that there is heavy reliance on the US by the current PPP leadership for providing policy direction in counterinsurgency operations. Pakistanis have to own the war against the militants and not fight it as a client state of America. Our leaders have to begin to take a much longer term view of the costs and benefits of the policies and decisions that they are taking in dealing with the militants.
The opposition party’s role in countering radicalism has been equally disappointing. The PML-N and the PML-Q consider it politically expedient to remain silent. Then there are politicians who perhaps have no stake in the system. A few liberal groups are raising their voice but they are not coherent and have failed to make an impact and are being countered by unfair allegations of being lackeys of the west.
The army’s role has been mostly reactive. It has been expecting that the civilian government will give it the necessary orders to undertake operations No doubt, it has undertaken several major operations in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat and made great sacrifices but lack of coordination between various agencies of the government has prevented it from optimising the gains. Energising the civil society is also crucial for winning the war against the Taliban. It is by mobilising public opinion against them that the tide could turn in our favour.
Then the question that needs an answer is: from where is the money coming to the insurgents? How is it that the Taliban are being paid more than the army personnel? Where are they getting the financial support for procurement of heavy weapons and maintaining a huge logistic infrastructure? Surely it is far more than what the militants could earn from drug transit and by taking hostages.


The writer is a retired lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net

 

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